(i) Indicative conditionals semantically express (i.e. can be used to assert the truth of) propositions. (ii) Which proposition is asserted by an utterance of an indicative conditional sentence sometimes depends on the context in which it is uttered. Moreover, (iii) which proposition is asserted depends, absent other sources of context sensitivity, on some piece of evidence or knowledge that is salient in the context of utterance (perhaps the utterer's evidence or some pooled piece of evidence being assumed by the participants of the conversation.)
Contextualism holds a distinguished place in recent philosophy (see [18] , [27] , [14] , [15] ), and for good reason. It promises to answer a number of rather puzzling issues in the philosophy of conditionals -the apparent validity of 'orto-if' arguments (see [18] ) and the so-called 'Gibbardian stand-offs' [27] to name but a couple of examples. While it also has its dissenters 1 it is interesting to note that, by contrast, the context sensitivity of conditionals is all but taken for granted by linguists working within the framework of Kratzer's [10] , which draws on an important connections between modals and conditionals (and in the former case at least, context sensitivity appears to be pervasive.)
My aim here, however, is not to defend contextualism or its applications, but to show that contextualism can be put to work to shed light on another difficult issue, namely that of providing a theory that predicts our intuitive judgments about the probability of conditional statements. Starting with Lewis's original paper on this topic it has often been noted that contextualism provides a potential way around the so called 'triviality results'. However, despite some limited initial optimism regarding this project (see in particular Harper [8] and van Fraassen [26] ), few philosophers still see this as a viable option. Most likely this is due to the fact that existing constructions either fall apart when one considers conditionals embedded within other conditionals or are not compatible with an orthodox possible worlds semantics such as a selection function semantics. Finally these constructions invariably require that the locus of context sensitivity be, not a proposition in accordance with thesis (iii), but an entire credential state. It is therefore hard to integrate such approaches into a modern day contextualist framework of the kind that dominates in linguistics and philosophy. 2 In this paper I will present two constructions that remedy these issues. The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 I outline an initially attractive thesis that links the probability of a conditional to its conditional probability known as 'Stalnaker's thesis'. While it is well known that this hypothesis is fraught with difficulties, I argue that for independent reasons it needs to be revised if you're a contextualist. I propose instead a different link between the probability of a conditional and conditional probabilities that should be acceptable to a contextualist. In section 2 I outline the formal framework with respect to which this new thesis will be evaluated and in sections 3 and 4 I provide two different tenability results establishing the consistency of the new principle. Differences between the two models are highlighted.
1
Suppose that a card has been picked at random from a standard 52 card deck and placed face down in front of you. Assuming that you are not more confident that some card will be selected over any other, how confident should you be about asserting the following sentences?
1. The selected card is an ace if it's red.
2. It's spades if it's black.
It's diamonds if it's an eight.
To be clear, when I ask how confident you should be about asserting a sentence I mean: what degree of belief should you have in the proposition that you would 2 Of the tenability results existing in the literature, some of which I will mention later, two in particular seem to be most relevant to my proposal here: that of Harper [8] and van Fraassen [26] . Although van Fraassen cites contextualist motivations in [26] , it is never made clear how his two formal constructions relate to the basic contextualist insight. Of the two constructions he provides one cannot account for iterated conditionals. The remaining construction is generated by assigning conditionals subsets of the unit interval (or any space that is 'full' -see [26] for definitions) that have the right size as semantic values. Accordingly the semantics is highly non-standard (it cannot be represented by a selection function, as van Fraassen notes) and so it is therefore not consistent with orthodox possible world accounts of conditionals. Furthermore, if one applies the construction within a contextualist framework the locus of context sensitivity cannot be a proposition, in accordance with thesis (iii), but an entire credential state. Harper's theory (which I only learnt of after writing this paper) does better in this last regard: it is based on a relatively standard possible worlds semantics and is compatible with thesis (iii). However it is restricted to the case where the probability of the conditional/conditional probability is 1 and so is also unsuitable as a general theory of probabilities of conditionals.
assert by uttering that sentence. The obvious answer to these questions are, in order: An initially attractive theory, known as 'Stalnaker's Thesis' 3 , gives us a general way to make these calculations. It states:
Stalnaker's Thesis: The degree of belief one should assign to a conditional sentence, 'if A then B', should be identical to ones conditional degree of belief in B given A. In [21] Stalnaker works with a theory of probability that assigns degrees of belief and conditional degrees of belief to sentences and not, as is normally done, to propositions. In what follows I shall read the thesis as saying that, if p, q and r are the propositions that would be asserted by the sentences A, B and 'if A then B' in a given context, then ones degree of belief in r must be identical to ones conditional degree of belief in q given p.
Stalnaker's Thesis gets its appeal from its simplicity and its ability to straightforwardly explain the probability judgments reported in 1-3. However, enthusiasm for the thesis quickly died down as a slew of results trivialising this theory appeared (see Bennett's [3] , chapter 5, for a good summary of the highlights) and Stalnaker himself quickly dropped the theory.
While I find this literature to be conclusive with regard to the thesis (at least as currently interpreted) there is an even more basic reason to be dissatisfied with Stalnaker's theory if you are a contextualist of the stripe described in the opening paragraph. According to the contextualist, there are lots of conditional propositions that one and the same conditional sentence, 'if A then B', can be used to assert, but only one conditional probability for the probabilities of those propositions to be identical with (provided neither A nor B are themselves context sensitive.)
To spell the worry out in full, suppose that neither A nor B are context sensitive and express p and q respectively in every context. Assume also that I can assert 'if A then B' in one context and thereby assert the proposition r, and in another context the proposition r . Since, by assumption, r and r are two different propositions, there is no general reason why one must assign them equal confidence. Indeed the possibility of having unequal degrees of confidence in r and r is essential if we are to account for the puzzles for which contextualism was introduced to explain (see, in particular, Gibbard's puzzle [6] .
5 ) Yet according to Stalnaker's thesis, ones degree of belief in both r and 3 Not to be confused with Adams' Thesis which employs the notion of 'assertability'. The assertability of a conditional, according to Adams, need not be identified with the probability of a proposition. 4 If Cr is a function representing your degrees of belief, then your conditional degree of belief in B given A, Cr(B | A), is defined to be
when Cr(A) > 0. 5 In [6] , Gibbard describes a situation in which one person appropriately utters a sentence 'if A then B', and another equally appropriately utters 'if A then not B' (and is also seemingly able to appropriately deny the sentence 'if A then B'.) From the audiences perspective both r must be identical to ones conditional degree of belief in p given q. In other words, Stalnaker's thesis entails that one must be equally confident in r and r after all.
What to make of these problems? One radical response, often made in connection to the triviality results, is to take these highly theoretical arguments to undermine the original probability judgments to 1-3. To my mind this response is excessive: triviality results do not cast doubt on particular probability judgments such as those reported in 1-3. They merely refute a general theory that predicts those judgments -the judgments themselves do not imply the refuted theory. Furthermore, if the answers I listed to 1-3 are not correct then those who make the radical response owe us an answer to the question: what are the correct answers to these particular questions? If they are not respectively The contextualist, in my view, has a better response; one that predicts the intuitive probability judgments in 1-3, but does not commit us to Stalnaker's thesis. According to the contextualist the judgments we make about the probabilities of conditional sentences are determined by two pieces of evidence. One piece of evidence determines which proposition is asserted by the utterance of the conditional being evaluated, the other is the evidence you actually possess, which determines what your degrees of belief are if you're rational (i.e. determines the probability function with which we make the actual judgments of probability.) In other words, the former determines which proposition is to be evaluated, and the latter determines how probable that proposition is. The proposed theory states that when these two pieces of evidence are identical, the probability of the conditional and the conditional probability coincide -the probability of the proposition you assert with a conditional when E is salient is the same as the conditional probability when your total evidence is E.
The revised thesis entails, for example, that when the utterer's evidence is identical to the contextually salient evidence she will assert a proposition using a conditional sentence that she takes to be exactly as probable as the conditional probability of the proposition expressed by the consequent on the proposition expressed by the antecedent. This is plausibly what is going on when we make the judgments reported in 1-3.
In order to make this thesis precise two questions must be addressed. Firstly, we must say how the contextually salient piece of evidence determines which proposition is expressed by a conditional sentence. Secondly we must say how the agent's evidence (the second piece of evidence) determines the agent's degrees of belief.
It turns out that the first question can be treated in very different ways; the models constructed in sections 3 and 4 provide two such treatments. For the speech acts seem appropriate (even if the audience may not express their agreement with the same sentences.) To accommodate this the contextualist will say that the first person asserted a highly probable proposition, whereas the second person denied a highly improbable proposition, albeit using the same sentence. The audience may thus find both speech acts appropriate, but only if they assign different probabilities to the propositions expressed by 'if A then B' in the two contexts.
time being let us just use the notation A → E B to represent the proposition that would be expressed by the conditional, in a context in which E is salient, whose antecedent expresses A and consequent expresses B. In order to address the second question I shall adopt a relatively standard Bayesian picture according to which each rational agent is associated with an initial probability function, sometimes called a 'prior' or an 'ur-prior'. 6 In order to determine what that agent's informed credences are at a time, t, assuming she is rational, we condition the agent's ur-prior on her total evidence at t: if P r is her ur-prior and E her total evidence at t then her credence at t is P r(· | E) if she is rational. My conditional credence of B on A at t is therefore just P r(B | AE). The revised thesis says that this is just identical to my credence in A → E B at t: P r(A → E B | E). Thus the precise statement of the thesis is CP P r(A → E B | E) = P r(B | AE) for every rational ur-prior P r and evidence E.
Here E ranges over propositions that could, in some possible world, be an agents total evidence. Of course the appeal to ur-priors is controversial and questions about their status are important, however I shall not delve into those issues here. I expect the thesis to be formulable without them, however the presentation of the principle CP in terms of them is particularly simple and will be easy to use in what follows.
7
It is worth noting that despite the impossibility results there has been a number of attempts to resurrect Stalnaker's thesis in some limited form (see van Fraassen [26] , McGee [13] , Stalnaker and Jeffrey [16] , Kaufmann [9] , Bradley [4] .) One thing to highlight about the present results, that distinguishes them from many of these results, is that CP applies to all propositions A and B, without any restriction on what kinds of iterations of conditionals are allowed -some of the mentioned results do not allow any kind of iterated conditional, and others allow limited iterations but not in the antecedent place.
8 While iterated conditionals are not as commonplace in ordinary discourse, it is just as important to account for them. For one thing, it is not clear that a syntactic restriction can rule out the instances of CP these theorists find problematic. Consider (1) and (2):
If it breaks without significant deformation if it is subjected to stress, it is not a suitable material (1) If it is brittle it is not a suitable material (2) 6 Sometimes philosophers use the word 'prior' to represent an agent's credences before they have undergone some episode but in which they are still informed about some matters. This is not how I am using it -by an 'ur-prior' I mean the credences of a completely uninformed agent.
7 For example, if you can make sense of a credence function being 'rational to have when your total evidence is E' you may restate CP with invoking ur-priors as follows: if Cr is a rational credence to have when your total evidence is E then Cr(A → E B) = Cr(B | A).
8 There is one exception: van Fraassen's [26] contains a tenability result showing that Stalnaker's thesis can hold for a single probability function without any restriction on iterated conditionals. Neither this result, nor any of the arguments cited, give us the generality of CP however.
Firstly note that (1), while an iterated conditional, is a perfectly reasonably thing to say -iterated conditionals are not a mere curiousity but a proper part of English. Secondly, even if (1) were improper (it is certainly harder to parse) the antecedents of (1) and (2) plausibly express the same proposition and (2) is certainly not improper. Indeed (2) is a simple conditional and yet is plausibly equivalent to an iterated conditional. Thus any thesis about the probability of (2) in a context ought to apply equally to (1) .
A more direct argument can also be given for including iterated conditionals within the scope of CP. Consider the following scenario:
Suppose you have ten numbered vases, three are shatterproof and the remaining seven are fragile enough to break if dropped. You also you know that two of the fragile vases are priceless, however you don't know which of the vases are priceless or fragile. Suppose also that there has recently been an earthquake and there is a chance that some of the vases have fallen from their shelves onto the floor.
How confident should you be that vase number eight is priceless if it was one of the vases that broke if it was dropped? The intuitive answer is calculated as follows: there are seven vases that will break if dropped. Furthermore, we know that out of those only two are priceless, so the proportion of priceless vases out of those that will break if dropped is intuitively 
2
Our first order of business is to be a bit more precise about what counts as a model for CP. We want a class of connectives, → E , that not only supports CP but also has a reasonable conditional logic. Of particular interest is the connective → E obtained where the relevant evidence, E, is tautologous -I'll call this the 'ur-conditional'. When E is tautologous I shall omit the subscript altogether and I'll simply write A → B.
We shall work within a modal propositional language, L, consisting of the usual truth functional connectives, ¬ and ⊃, from which the other truth functional connectives are definable, and a special binary modal connective representing the ur-conditional, →. I shall adopt the ordinary definitions of ∧, ∨, ⊥ in terms of ⊃ and ¬. I shall also adopt the following shorthands:
To increase readability, as is typically done in probability theory, I shall frequently shorten A ∧ B to AB.
My focus will be on the theory which I'll call L. L can be axiomatised by closing the following axioms under modus ponens (for the material conditional ⊃), the rule of uniform substitution and the rules RCN and RCEA.
The first five principles seem like a reasonable place to start looking for a logic of indicatives. MP, for example, just states that → obey modus ponens. 9 Of particular note are the final two axioms, CEM and C1. The axiom CEM, short for 'conditional excluded middle', is distinctive to Stalnaker's logic of conditionals, C2, and constitutes the primary difference between it and a similar theory due to Lewis [11] .
C1 on the other hand governs the behaviour of conditionals that are vacuously true. When we are concerned with indicatives a conditional is vacuously true when the antecedent is epistemically impossible in the relevant sense. The only cases in which A → ⊥ is true are cases in which the conditional is vacuously true; in these cases I'll say that A 'crashes'. Since we are focussing on the ur-conditional the only proposition ruled out by your evidence is the contradictory proposition. Thus when → represents the ur-conditional several further principles are motivated such as C0
If A crashes, then A is inconsistent so A ∨ B and B ought to be equivalent and thus ought to conditionally imply the same propositions. (It is not entirely clear to me whether C0 is valid when the ur-conditional is replaced by → E for contingent E so I leave that open in what follows.) It is worth noting that the system that results from replacing C1 with C0 in L has C1 as a derived theorem. C0 is therefore strictly stronger than C1.
Furthermore, if the only proposition that crashes is the inconsistent proposition then we should expect the defined operator 2 ('¬A crashes') to iterate in accordance with the modal logic S5. In particular we want:
Philosophers sceptical of modus ponens, or indeed any of the other principles, can still take interest in the tenability results. If CP is consistent with the logic L, it is certainly consistent with the weakenings of L. 10 The particular formulations of these principles are due to Cian Dorr. Given our definition of 2 they are provably equivalent to the principles 2A → 22A and A → ¬2¬2A respectively.
Neither of these principles are motivated when → is substituted for conditionals expressed by agents with evidence. If we were to define a 2 E operator as ¬A → E ⊥, this would express some kind of epistemic necessity which may not iterate in the way predicted by 4 and B.
Natural analogies between L and Stalnaker's logic C2 can be drawn. The most salient difference is that this logic does not have the theorem
Indeed adding CSO to L collapses the logic into Stalnaker's, so in this sense we can think of L as what you get by removing CSO from C2. In my view this is a benefit of the present account: CSO has been subjected to a number of counterexamples (see Tichỳ [24] (and the variant discussed by Stalnaker in [23] ), Maartenson [12] , Tooley [25] and Ahmed [2] ) and is also responsible for some of the triviality results (see Stalnaker [19] and Hájek and Hall [7] .) However this is not the venue for a full defence of this feature of the logic so I shall put it to one side for now.
A frame for a conditional logic is a pair W, f where W is a set of worlds and f :
A model is a pair F, · where F is a frame and · maps propositional letters to subsets of W . · extends to a function from the rest of L to P(W ) as follows:
A sentence, φ, is true in a model W, f, · iff φ = W , and is valid on a frame iff it's true in every model based on that frame, and valid on a class of frames iff it is valid on every member of that class.
RCEA, RCN and CK are valid on the class of all frames. Combinations of the remaining principles are validated on the class of frames that additionally satisfy the corresponding combination of conditions from the below list:
In the presence of CEM the selection function always either picks out a singleton or the empty set. In this case we can modify the semantics to conform with Stalnaker's original [17] semantics so that f maps us from a world, w, and a set of worlds, A, to a single possible world (namely x if f (A, w) = {x} in the general semantics) or the unique impossible world # (if f (A, w) = ∅) in the general semantics) at which every sentence is stipulated to be true. In certain circumstances it will be useful to translate between Stalnaker's semantics and Chellas's slightly more general semantics which allows for more than one world to be selected.
If we want to guarantee 4 and B as well, one can stipulate that
This of course encodes the principle that A crashes only if it's the inconsistent proposition. This condition automatically ensures C0 and (thus) C1. So much for the ur-conditional. What of the conditionals → E when E is contingent? A very natural thought would be simply to define this conditional in terms of the ur-conditional as follows:
This has the effect of guaranteeing that the truth value of an indicative conditional, 'if A then B', in a context is a function of the epistemically possible A-worlds in that context (where the epistemically possible worlds are just those consistent with the contextually salient evidence E.) It is worth noting that defining A → E B this way preserves all of the axioms of L except for MP. The reason MP fails is quite simple: if A is epistemically impossible (i.e. is inconsistent with E) then the conditional A → E B is vacuously true for any choice of B. Thus we can have failures of modus ponens for the → E connective at epistemically impossible worlds: if A is epistemically impossible (is inconsistent with E) and x is an epistemically impossible world (does not belong to E) in A then A is true at x, and A → E ⊥ is vacuously true at x, while ⊥ is not true. Of course, modus ponens is always applicable assuming the contextually salient proposition, E, is part of your evidence: this is because the rule E, A, A → E B B is validated -you have E by hypothesis, so once you know A and A → E B you can infer B.
As we shall see, only the first of the two models makes the above identification. However the remarks above suggest a general constraint that each of the conditionals → E should satisfy. In addition to the other axioms of L (excluding MP), they should also satisfy the axiom:
The corresponding semantic constraint on the selection function, f E , for → E , is:
This concludes our discussion of the constraints on the selection function. The following definition will be useful in what follows: Definition 2.0.1. Given a frame W, f , say that the selection function is regular on E ⊆ W if it satisfies the frame conditions for CEM, MP E , ID and C1.
A selection function is normal on E if it is regular on E and f (A, x) = ∅ iff A ∩ E = ∅. Frames based on normal selection functions on E validate B, 4 and C0 in addition to the principles CEM, MP E , ID and C1.
2.1
How should one understand the above semantics, and in particular, what does the selection function intuitively represent? The interpretation initially given to the selection function by Stalnaker in [17] was that f (A, x) picks out (the singleton of) the closest world to x in which A is true, where closeness is determined by some measure of similarity between worlds. This interpretation initially attracted a lot of criticism. For one thing, it requires that there be a unique closest A-world to x when the relevant notion of closeness seems to determine no such thing. Another issue is that it is not clear what the relevant notion of closeness is when we are trying to evaluate indicative, as opposed to subjunctive, conditionals. Many have the intuition that indicative conditionals are in some sense epistemic and conclude that, since the notion of closeness relevant for evaluating subjunctives is irrelevant here and no epistemic notion is forthcoming, indicatives should not be analysed in terms of closeness.
Lewis's response to the first objection -that there might not be a unique closest world -in the case of subjunctives, is to relax the constraint that the selection function pick out a unique world. In terms of the constraints listed above this means relaxing the constraint that |f (A, x)| ≤ 1. Accordingly, f (A, x) must be allowed to pick out a set of closest worlds without any assumption that there must be at most one of these.
11 Unfortunately this has the knock on effect of invalidating CEM. 12 Lewis was primarily concerned with subjunctive conditionals, and subjunctive instances of CEM are often controversial for good reason. When we are concerned with simple past tense indicative sentences, however, CEM appears to be much harder to deny. Contrast:
1. Either the coin would land heads if it were flipped or it would land tails.
Either the coin landed heads it if was flipped or it landed tails.
While the former is disputable, the latter surely isn't (assuming we are not taking seriously the possibility that the coin could do anything other than land heads or land tails.
13 ) Of course, Lewis himself does not apply his own brand of 'closest world' style semantics to indicative conditionals -my point is just that there are very good reasons not to relax the condition that |f (A, x)| ≤ 1 in the case of simple past indicatives.
Much has been said on this, and I do not want to adjudicate between the various responses Stalnaker and others have put forth in favour of this interpre- 11 To properly represent Lewis's semantics we'd have to go beyond the simple selection function semantics described in this section, since Lewis's semantics allows for failures of the limit assumption.
12 If f ( A , x) = {y, z}, y = z and B = {y} then x belongs to neither A → B nor A → ¬B . 13 Some indicatives don't behave like this: indicatives with 'will' in the consequent are known to behave a lot more like subjunctive conditionals. I don't want to include habitual indicatives either -sentences phrased in the simple present such as: 'if the window is left open, Granny jumps out'. These sentences most probably have a more complicated logical form than that of a simple conditional and thus may not actually represent counterexamples to conditional excluded middle.
tation. I will say one thing, however. One question we have been considering concerns whether there is always a unique closest A-world, and indeed whether it is even appropriate to use the notion of 'closeness' in the semantics of indicative conditionals. Another very different question asks whether CEM is valid for past tense indicatives. There is no reason to think that an answer one way or the other to the first question should determine our answer to the second, especially if indicative conditionals are not to be analysed in terms of closeness. There is consequently no reason why indicatives cannot be modelled using a selection function semantics that validates CEM, provided the selection function is not analysed in terms of closeness.
How to interpret the selection function then? Assume, with Stalnaker, that |f (A, x)| ≤ 1. Then a more neutral way of putting things would be as follows:
For subjunctive conditionals, f (A, x) represents the way things would have gone (at x) had A obtained.
For indicatives, f (A, x) represents the way things went if A.
Of course, for Stalnaker, the world that would have obtained if A had obtained just is the closest world at which A obtains. But this identification is not forced on us, and one can still say everything we want to say about the semantics of conditionals by interpreting the selection function in the more neutral way. An important upshot of this way of thinking is that we undermine the ordinary reasons for accepting the constraint
This validates the principle CSO which would have the effect of collapsing the logic L into Stalnaker's logic C2. CSO is guaranteed on a closeness based semantics: if the closest A-world is a B-world and the closest B-world is an A-world then the closest A-world is the closest B-world. On the neutral interpretation of the selection function, however, no such constraint is forced on us.
2.2
So far we have just been concerned with the interpretation of the conditional. In order to model CP we also need to talk about probabilities and evidence. In particular we need to enrich the frames with a class of probability functions representing the ur-priors, and a set of propositions which represent the propositions that could, in some possible world, be some agent's total evidence.
The following definition provides us with a precise framework against which we can evaluate the truth of CP: Definition 2.0.2. A probability frame is a tuple W, B, f · , Σ, P where
• W is a set of worlds
• B is a complete Boolean algebra of subsets of W , containing W , representing the evidence propositions.
• Given E ∈ B, f E is a regular selection function on E.
• Σ is a σ-algebra (a set of subsets of W containing ∅ and closed under complements in W and countable unions.)
• P is a non-empty set of countably additive probability measures over Σ representing the set of rational ur-priors.
We are looking for probability frame that satisfy CP; such frames will be called adequate: Definition 2.0.3. A probability frame W, B, f · , Σ, P is adequate if and only if
• P r(B | AE) = P r({x | f E (A, x) ⊆ B} | E) for every P r ∈ P , A, B ∈ Σ and E ∈ B ∩ Σ It will often be useful to write A ⇒ E B instead of {x | f E (A, x) ⊆ B}. We also adopt the convention of dropping the subscript when E is tautologous.
Our goal, then, is to construct an adequate frame. However there are other conditions we might also want to explore. For example Normality: A frame is normal iff f E is a normal selection function on E for each E ∈ B.
This of course shows that a stronger logic than L is compatible with CP. Both the models we will consider shortly are normal. Another constraint we might want to implement is:
Fullness: A frame is full iff B = P(W ).
A principled reason to weaken the fullness condition would be if you thought that only categorical propositions (i.e. non-conditional propositions) could be an agents total evidence. In a full frame every proposition, categorical or hypothetical, could in principle be an agent's total evidence. We shall return to the question of whether a conditional proposition could be an agent's total evidence in the next section. For now let me just highlight it as a possible further constraint in addition to adequacy. Finally we might also want the constraint:
where f is the ur-selection function.
The condition above is stated in van Rooy [27] , who attributes the idea to Harper in [8] .
14 The basic thought behind Harper's condition is this: whether an utterance of a conditional is true (at a world x) should be a function of the 14 Actually van Rooy states that f E (A, x) = f ∅ (AE, x) when AE = ∅. When AE = ∅, however, van Rooy stipulates that f E (A, x) = f ∅ (A, x). On this interpretation A → E ⊥ can be false even if A is inconsistent with E: this has the effect of making → E satisfy MP even at the epistemically impossible worlds. This is mostly a matter of taste -the following results can be reformulated with van Rooy's assumption.
epistemically possible A worlds at that context (the set of epistemically accessible A-worlds is just AE.) Harper's condition is quite strong, and Stalnaker has suggested the following weaker condition (I have reformulated it from Stalnaker [22] to match our current conventions.)
Stalnaker's condition does not require that the truth of a conditional 'if A then B' must depend only on the epistemically possible A-worlds -it is compatible that there be two distinct contexts providing propositions E and E such that AE = AE but where A → E B is true and A → E B is false.
Both the models that follow are normal and satisfy Stalnaker's condition. The first model satisfies Harper's condition but isn't full, whereas the second model is full but does not satisfy Harper's condition. 15 
First tenability result
In this section we will construct a model for CP. Several things that are worth noting about this model 1. All of the selection functions are determined by the ur-selection function in accordance with Harper's condition:
2. All of the selection functions are normal so that f E (A, x) = ∅ only if A ∩ E = ∅ thus all of the conditionals satisfy B, 4 and C0.
3. The model is not full: the set of evidence propositions, B is a strict subset of the set of all proposition P(W ). Here B intuitively represents the categorical (non-conditional) propositions.
4. P is a fairly rich set of probability functions. In fact, for every probability function P r over the non-conditional propositions, B, there is a unique probability function in P whose restriction to B is P r.
The third point is particularly worthy of note. According to the informal gloss, B represents the set of propositions that could, in some possible world, be an agent's total evidence. Since some propositions do not belong to B according to this model it follows that there are some propositions that could not be an agent's total evidence. Fortunately there is an intuitive interpretation of this feature of the model.
In the model we start off with an initial set of objects, which we can think of as possible worlds, and the propositions in B can be identified with arbitrary sets of these worlds. We can think of a possible world as determining all the ordinary facts concerning where objects are located, and so on and so forth, but not the conditional facts. For example a possible world might determine that a particular coin, C, isn't flipped on a particular occasion, but it won't determine whether the coin will land heads or tails if it is flipped at that occasion. Thus there will be two epistemic possibilities, corresponding to the same worldly facts (i.e. the same possible world), and according to one the coin lands heads if it is flipped, and according to the other it lands tails if flipped. In general, then, B represents non-hypothetical/non-conditional propositions and can be represented by sets of possible worlds whilst the full set of propositions, including hypothetical propositions, and can be represented by sets of epistemically possible worlds.
Why then, couldn't an arbitrary hypothetical proposition, say the proposition that the coin C will land heads if it's flipped, be an agent's total evidence? A common observation for views accepting CEM is that conditionals like these give rise to a curious epistemic phenomenon: in this case it doesn't seem to be possible to find out whether the coin will land heads if flipped when the coin is never flipped. For example, if you accept conditional excluded middle then either C will land heads if it is flipped, or it will land tails, but in worlds where the coin is not flipped it is impossible to obtain further evidence to settle the question of which way it would land if flipped. Philosophers subscribing to the law of conditional excluded middle have conjectured that hypothetical propositions like this are a special source of indeterminacy (e.g. [20] .) Whether or not this is so we can certainly agree that we must be ignorant in the scenario described, much as we would be in the face of vagueness or indeterminacy. The basic intuition is that one can have any credence you like regarding the completely determinate non-hypothetical facts, but once you have fixed your credences in those propositions your credences over the rest of the space of propositions is fixed. For example, if you know that C is fair and will not be flipped, then you are forced to have a credence of a half in the proposition that C will land heads if flipped. The situation here is similar to the analogous situation with vague propositions. Once you know someone has a certain borderline number of hairs, N , you are forced to be uncertain, to some degree, in the proposition that that person is bald.
Of course, we learn conditionals all the time; it is important to keep in mind that this fact is completely consistent with the thesis that our total evidence is never conditional. According to the logic L, when one learns that A and B then one learns the conditional stating that if A then B, and when you learn that A and ¬B you can rule out the conditional if A then B. But in these cases your total evidence (AB and A ∧ ¬B respectively) is strictly stronger than the conditional facts you've learnt. In other cases we know conditionals even when we are ignorant about the antecedent and consequent. Even when you do not know whether the fuse will blow or the light will go off, it is quite reasonable to assert that if the fuse blows the light will go off. But in these cases it is natural to think that your assertion is only appropriate when you know a stronger strict conditional (say, that in all nomically possible worlds in which the fuse blows the light goes off.) When you do not know the strict conditional, such as in the case of the coin flip, it is not appropriate to assert the indicative conditional, even if it is in fact true.
The construction
The following construction uses the ideas developed by van Fraassen's in his 'Bernoulli -Stalnaker' models from [26] . However van Fraassen's models do not satisfy the principle CP for two reasons. Firstly, there is only one conditional connective that satisfies a variant of the conditional to conditional probability link, whereas CP states something much more general (that some form of the link holds for each conditional connective you can express in some context or other.) Secondly in van Fraassen's model the probability conditional to conditional probability link holds only for special conditionals and does not extend to iterated conditionals of various sorts. The following construction is, in a loose sense, the result of iterating van Fraassen's construction ω 1 many times.
The construction begins with an initial set of possible worlds, W , which intuitively can be thought of as representing maximally specific things that can be said about the world without mentioning conditional facts (i.e. facts about what will happen if this or that happens.) The set W ∞ then extends this set, dividing members of W into epistemic possibilities according to the kind of hypothetical distinctions you can make. Epistemic possibilities can be thought of as ordered pairs of ordinary worlds and sequences of worlds, with the latter encoding all the conditional facts that hold at that epistemic possibility. An ordered pair of a world and a sequence is isomorphic another sequence with an extra initial element -thus epistemic possibilities will just be represented as sequences of possible worlds.
Let us put this into practice. Assume that the initial set of states, W , that do not involve conditional facts is given and is countable. The set of worlds in our model will be the set W ∞ = W ω1 = {π | π : ω 1 → W }. We shall set B = {A × W ∞ | A ⊆ W }. B is isomorphic to P(W ) and is thus a complete Boolean algebra. It is easy to see that B embeds into the larger algebra of all propositions, which we shall denote B ∞ = P(W ∞ ).
Given our initial space W , define the following sequence of sets for α < ω 1
That is, W α represents the set of all ω α sequences of members of W . Since ω α < ω 1 whenever α < ω 1 it follows that an element of W α will be isomorphic to an initial segment of a member of W ∞ . Note also the following consequences of this definition:
In what follows we shall adopt a practice of identifying products which are isomorphic to subsets of W ∞ , allowing us, for example, to identify A × W ∞ with a subset of W ∞ whenever A is contained in some W α .
The sets W α for α < ω 1 help us describe the measurable sets.
Definition 3.0.4. Suppose X is a set of subsets of W ∞ . Then cl(X) is the closure of X under the operations of countable unions and intersections, and complements relative to W ∞ .
The measurable sets, which we shall denote Σ ∞ , can be thought of as being approximated by an infinite sequence of σ-algebras, Σ α ⊂ B ∞ for α < ω 1 .
Note that Σ α+1 is generated by sets of the form A 0 × . . . × A n × W ∞ where A i ⊆ W α . Each of these generating sets consists of an ω 1 sequence such that an initial finite number of elements belong to W α and the rest belong to W . This is, of course, just equivalent to an ω 1 sequence of elements of W whenever α < ω 1 : it is just equivalent to n successive ω α -sequences of elements of W followed by an ω 1 -sequence of elements of W , which is itself an ω 1 -sequence of elements of W . Bearing this equivalence in mind we can see from the construction that an arbitrary member of Σ α will be of the form A × W ∞ where A ⊆ W α . It is straightforward to show
Now we turn to our definition of Σ ∞ , the set of measurable sets.
Definition 3.1.1. A set A ∈ B ∞ is measurable iff A ∈ Σ α for some α. We denote the set of measurable sets Σ ∞ := α<ω1 Σ α .
It should now become apparent why we chose the ordinal ω 1 in our definitions: it is due to this choice that our measurable sets are closed under countable unions so that Σ ∞ is a σ-algebra. Definition 3.1.2. If A is measurable then the rank of A is the smallest α such that A ∈ Σ α . We shall write this: rank(A) = α. If A is not measurable then rank(A) = ∞.
It is now time to define the ur-selection function for a A ∈ B ∞ of rank α (possibly identical to ∞). If A is non-empty let τ A be any member of A (it doesn't matter which.)
if there is no such number and A = ∅ # A = ∅ Note that this is formally reminiscent of Stalnaker's semantics: f (A, π) represents the closest world to π which belongs to A, where closeness depends on how small the 'i' is -the crucial difference is that the notion of closeness at play here depends on the rank of the antecedent, A. It is easy to verify that f is normal. In particular, the second condition -that f (A, π) = τ if A is non-empty and there is no A-world in the sequence of π[ω α .i]'s -is to ensure that f (A, π) does not output the impossible world unless A = ∅ (if we were to replace τ A with # in the definition we get a merely regular selection function.) In order to obtain f E we simply identify f E (A, x) with f (AE, x) in accordance with Harper's condition. We now define the set, P , of ur-priors. For simplicity we have assumed that W is countable so that every subset of W can be treated as a measurable set (although it would be simple enough to drop this assumption and work with an initial σ-algebra over W instead.) We shall show that every regular countably additive probability function P r on the powerset algebra on W extends to the measurable sets over B ∞ . We then identify P with the set of all such probability functions generated this way.
Suppose that P r is a regular countably additive probability function on B. For α ≤ ω 1 we define P r α over Σ α as follows.
• P r 0 = P r
extends to the rest of Σ α+1 via Carathéodory's extension theorem.
• P r γ (A) = P r α (A) when A ∈ Σ α for α < γ. This extends to the rest of Σ γ by Carathéodory's extension theorem.
Write P r ∞ for P r ω1 . Observe, from the construction of P r ∞ , that for any α < ω 1 and A 0 , . . . ,
We are now in a position to prove our main theorem.
Theorem 3.3. The frame W ∞ , B, f · , Σ ∞ , P is adequate.
In particular, if P r is a countably additive regular probability function over W then P r ∞ ∈ P and P r ∞ (A ⇒ E B | E) = P r ∞ (B | AE) whenever P r(A) > 0, E ∈ B and A, B and E are measurable. 
Let R be the set of π with
Here I am using X to denote the complement of X. Note that R ⊆ (A ) ω × W ∞ which has probability 0 whenever P r ∞ (A) > 0. Since we are calculating a union of disjoint sets we have
The above demonstrates the result for the ur-conditional: P r ∞ (A ⇒ B | E) = P r ∞ (B | A). It remains to show that P r ∞ (A ⇒ E B | E) = P r ∞ (B | AE) arbitrary E. Recall that A ⇒ E B is equivalent to A ∩ E ⇒ B. We shall now demonstrate that CP holds in this model. Theorem 3.4. If E ∈ Σ 0 and P r ∈ P then P r(A ⇒ B|E) = P r(AB | E) + P r(Ā | E)P r(B | A).
Proof. Suppose that E = E × W ∞ where E ⊆ W . Then in general, for any α,
From theorem 3.3 we know that P r E (A ⇒ B) = Σ n P r E ((A )
Expanding this sum and applying the observation above we get = 1 P r(E) (P r(ABE)+ P r(ĀE)Σ n (P r(Ā) n P r(AB)) =
This reduces to P r(AB | E)+P r(A | E)P r(B | AE) = P r(AB | E)+P r(B | AE) − P r(A | E)P r(B | AE) using P r(Ā | E) = 1 − P r(A | E). Note that by the definition of conditional probability Q(AB) = Q(A)Q(B | A), so P r(AB | E) = P r(A | E)P r(B | AE). Thus the last expression cancels out to P r(B | AE) as required.
Thus P r(A ⇒ E B) = P r(B | AE)
Second Tenability Result
Here we construct instead a probability frame that is normal, full and satisfies Stalnaker's condition. However, unlike the previous construction, this construction does not satisfy Harper's condition. Here it will be useful to use Stalnaker's original selection function semantics in which f maps us into W (so f (A, x) picks out a world instead of a singleton of a world. When A crashes, f (A, x) picks out a distinguished object, #, the impossible world, instead of the empty set.) In this model we use only probability functions defined over the real numbers -to distinguish these we shall use greek letters 'µ', 'ρ' and so on, to denote measures on the reals with 'λ' being reserved for the standard Lebesgue measure. Given a probability space W, Σ, µ we define a subspace of W to be those spaces of the form X, Σ ∩ P(X), µ(· | X) with X ∈ Σ. I shall write µ X for µ(· | X) and Σ X for Σ ∩ P(X).
We need to employ a notion from measure theory -that of a measurepreserving map: 
As usual, the preimage of a set A under the function f , written f −1 (A), is defined as {x | f (x) ∈ A}. Definition 4.0.2. A selection function, f , is stretchy on a probability space W, Σ, µ iff for every measurable A ∈ W , the restriction of f (A, ·) toĀ, f (A, ·) : A → A, is measure preserving on the spaces Ā , µĀ , A, µ A . HereĀ just means W \ A.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that there exists a tuple W, Σ, µ, t A satisfying the following conditions:
1. Σ is a σ-algebra over W , 2. µ a probability measure over Σ and for each non-empty A ⊆ W ,
Then the selection function f defined as f (A, ·) = id A ∪ t A is stretchy, where id A is the identity function on A. More precisely, f , as defined below, is stretchy:
Any set A in Σ which has measure in (0, 1) is stretched out onto its complement by f in a way that preserves the measure of its measurable subsets. (In the models we consider any pair of sets, X and Y , with measures in (0, 1], can be stretched on to the other.)
Note also that f is normal and thus will validate CEM, MP, ID, 4, B and C0. By construction f (A, x) ∈ A and f (A, x) = x whenever x ∈ A. But notice further that A crashes (f (A, x) = #) only if A = ∅, so the principles C0, B and 4 for crashing are validated in this kind of model as well. 16 So the logic of stretchy selection functions of this type is at least L+C0+4+B. Whether the logic of stretchy selection functions generated this way is exactly this logic bears further investigation.
It should be clear that A (B)) = µ(AB) + 0 = µ(B). Suppose that µ(A) ∈ (0, 1). 16 In my view neither C0 B nor 4 are valid; however for the purposes of showing that a reasonable logic is consistent with Stalnaker's thesis this does not matter as every sublogic is also shown to be consistent.
Existence of a model
Here we construct a full model, W, B, f · , Σ, P , for CP. In this model worlds will be identified with real numbers, with the constraint that the selection functions f E are stretchy on E.
• W := [0, 1]
• B := P([0, 1])
• P := {λ} where λ is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1].
• Σ is the Lebesgue measurable subsets of [0, 1].
• f E is a normal selection function on E which is additionally stretchy on E, Σ E , λ E for every measurable E with positive measure.
One thing to note about this model is that I have only specified one ur-prior, λ. This does not appear to be an essential restriction -the following proof works with any measure isomorphic to the Lebesgue measure, so we could equally well expand P to {λ | [0, 1], Σ, λ ∼ = [0, 1], Σ, λ } -i.e. the set of measures on [0,1] with the Lebesgue measurable sets, that are isomorphic to the Lebesgue measure. 17 For example, while the Lebesgue measure is generated by stipulating that the length of an interval (a, b) is b − a, the measure one gets by stipulating that the 'length' of the interval (a, b) be given by b 2 − a 2 is isomorphic to λ even though it is a very different measure.
I have thus explicitly defined every aspect of the model except for the selection functions, f E . The only thing to prove, then, is that we can find a stretchy selection function for every measurable E ⊆ [0, 1]. By proposition 4.1 it suffices to show that for any measurable E (of positive finite measure) and measurable A ⊆ E where A, E \ A have positive finite measure, we can find a measure preserving function fromĀ := E \ A to A, t A . Indeed, we shall go one further and show that for any two measurable sets of reals, X and Y , of positive and finite measure there is a measure preserving function, t,from X to Y .
For existence of a model it thus suffices to prove the following • h(α) = y if there is exactly one y such that g(y) = α w otherwise here w is simply a randomly selected member of Y , it does not matter which. We will also make use of the following property of the Lebesgue measure: Nifty fact: the Lebesgue measure, λ, is regular. This means that:
Then by regularity (form 2) and the fact that f is measure preserving on closed sets we have: λ(S) = sup{λ(C) | C ⊆ S, C is closed} = sup{µ X (f −1 (C)) | C ⊆ S, C is closed} ≤ µ X (f −1 (S)) So λ(S) = µ X (f −1 (S)) as required. The argument that g is measurepreserving is exactly analogous. Now to finish the argument we have Theorem 4.5. h is measure preserving.
Proof. Suppose that Z ⊆ Y .
Our strategy will be to show that µ Y (Z) = µ Y (g −1 (h −1 (Z))). This suffices since µ Y (g −1 (h −1 (Z))) = λ(h −1 (Z)) by the fact that g is measure preserving. Here goes. g −1 (h −1 (Z)) = {y | g(y) ∈ h −1 (Z)} = {y | ∃!z : g(z) = g(y) and z ∈ Z} = Z \ {y | g(y) = g(z) for some z = y} = Z \ g −1 ({α | |g −1 ({α})| > 1}). Now note that the set S := {α | |g −1 ({α})| > 1} is countable. We can map S injectively into Q as follows: if α ∈ S, then since |g −1 ({α})| > 1 there is a rational number, q, strictly inside the convex hull of g −1 ({α}). So we can map α to q. This mapping is injective because g is increasing: if α < β then the convex hull of g −1 ({α}) and of g −1 ({β}) overlap at most at a boundary point (since, if α < β, g(x) = α and g(y) = β then x ≤ y) and we have chosen q not to be a boundary point. Now, of course, {α} has Lebesgue measure 0, so µ Y (g −1 ({α})) = 0 since g is measure preserving. So g −1 ({α | |g −1 ({α})| > 1}) is a countable union of null sets, and is thus a null set. So putting this all together we have
This completes the proof. To obtain a measure preserving map, t, from X to Y we simply let t = h • f .
